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The Wilting Flower of Hope:  The Modern Iranian Reform Movement 
 
by Tanya Basu 
 
(Honors Political Science 221) 
 
The Assignment:  Students were asked to pick a topic on a country of interest in 
the Middle East and write a ten page research paper on the subject. 
 
 
 
“The future of religion is that it has to cope with freedom; otherwise it has no future.  If religion 
confronts freedom, then religion will suffer.” (Montaigne 33) 
 
hus does Mohammad Khatami, the reformist President of Iran, voice the struggles of the 
Islamic republic today and its battle to compromise religion and state in the twenty-first 
century.  For a nation plagued with many social, political, and economic problems, 
Khatami has offered hope for the liberalization of Iran’s strict interpretation of Shi’ism and the 
possible establishment of a secular democracy.  Citizens saw the 1979 Islamic Revolution under 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini as a promise of more prosperous times free from the shah’s harsh 
rule.  However, many of Ayatollah Khomeini’s pledges have yet to be fulfilled, especially 
regarding justice, freedom, and economic policies, heralding in the Khatami era.  Although 
Khatami represents a flicker of optimism for the dire situation in Iran, his term is coming to an 
end, and a reemergence of the Islamic Revolution is brimming with active conservative agendas.  
Yet, it is necessary to first explore the roots of the modern revolution prior to venturing into the 
consequences it may yield not only for Iran, but also for the world. 
As much as numerous Americans may view Ayatollah Khomeini as a tyrant, it is 
impossible to refute the fact that he was an immense force behind the 1979 Islamic Revolution 
and improved upon the shah.  After Ayatollah Khomeini successfully overthrew the shah, paved 
roads, water, and electricity appeared in rural areas-a feat that the wealthy shah had not been able 
to accomplish.  Higher education for the masses occurred, including women, a notable example 
of equality of the sexes in an Islamic country.  Also, Khomeini was able to make Iran a country 
that was unusually receptive and tolerant to other religions (the blaring exception being followers 
of the Baha’i faith).  However, it is unquestionably the rural areas that benefited the most under 
the new rule of the Ayatollah and his policies.  Telephone lines, bridges, drinking water systems, 
and irrigation pumps were installed to help isolated villagers.  The Ayatollah is heavily credited 
with designing the “Crusade for Construction” program, which aimed to aid those suffering from 
destitution (Montaigne 10).  In spite of perceptions in the Western world of the Ayatollah being a 
power hungry oppressor, his achievements qualify him for the title of “reformist,” although his 
idea of reform is very different from that of Mohammad Khatami. 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s original vision remains vibrantly alive today and is 
enjoying a resurgence by the conservative majority in government.  According to the Ayatollah, 
the state should be founded on the principles of independence, freedom, and velayat-e faqih, or 
the supremacy of Shi’a jurists.  Of late, however, the blending of state with the divine, channeled 
through the authoritarian power of a supreme leader, has begun to raise questions, as theologians 
are finding that the Koran prohibits the absolute power of a mere mortal human being.  
T 
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Accusations from theologians such as the philosophy’s chief originator, Grand Ayatollah 
Hossein Ali Montazeri, initiated public skepticism, mainly due to the fact that the prosperity and 
social justice promised had not been delivered, giving rise to the possibility that corruption could 
have interfered with the philosophy’s success.  The misery index’s colossal increases, the severe 
drop in income, and the reintroduction of poverty pointed towards a nauseous economy, further 
bringing the regime’s right to exist in question among the public (Amuzegar 50-52). 
Four cofactors worked together to bring the modern revolution to full throttle.  The first 
was the strong patriotism Iranians hold for their country, resulting from years of suspicion and 
growing bitterness against foreign forces who did not help them in the Iraq initiated war of the 
1980’s.  A second aspect of the revolution is domestic policies.  “Reformers” and 
“conservatives” both believe in the revolution and fiercely protect the 1979 Constitution.  In fact, 
neither reformers nor conservatives share the West’s concept of human rights and prefer to abide 
by the Koran’s interpretation of such matters.  What marks the reformers from the conservatives 
is primarily economic and political in nature.  A third asset that ignited a will to change was the 
Shi’a interpretation of religion.  Although seen by the West as a restricting religious sect, it 
technically does not bar the follower from modernization.  Finally, and most importantly, the 
coming of age of the Third Force has significantly increased interest in reforming Iran.  The 
“Third Force” is the name given to young Iranians who did not live through the shah’s rule.  This 
is not to say that they desire separation of religion from state; indeed, much of the “Third Force” 
seek the two to remain intertwined, for secularism is not seen as a realistic choice in the current 
climate.  The Third Force feels that their careers and lives are halted because of the Ayatollah’s 
leadership and distrust many of the clergy in office.  These four influences combined and 
continue to effect modern politics, giving Khatami the chance to reshape Iran (Amuzegar 48-50). 
For his part, Khatami introduced several measures that encouraged Westerners to interact 
with Iran and gave signs of developments that many surmised could signal the end of the regime.  
Khatami’s policies follow two distinct patterns.  The first is the embracing of civil disobedience 
and its effect on relaxing the theocracy’s firm grasp on daily lives.  Khatami quietly supported 
organizations that were not approved by the government to address problems in society, 
especially those facing women and the economic chaos facing the nation.  The government’s 
stranglehold on the press was loosened, and the Internet became a popular channel for dissidents, 
many of whom were living abroad.  Most importantly, street demonstrations have become more 
commonplace with responses from the government coming in the form of increases in the 
minimum wage, for example.  The second and major portion of Khatami’s policies focused on 
the economy.  Khatami introduced policies that would reduce the power of the theocracy to 
control the majority of funds from the gross domestic product (primarily oil) as well as to 
integrate Iran with modern needs in the global marketplace so as to break from its current 
dependence on oil.  Utilizing pressure from international banking associations such as the 
International Monetary Fund, Khatami was able to reduce the power of the theocracy by 
introducing access to foreign credit.  Another step towards revitalizing the economy occurred in 
2000, when Khatami engineered a bill legalizing private banking and insurance, allowing 
national savings to move from the Ayatollah’s treasure chest to be shared with the public.  
Khatami’s economic reforms reached their pinnacle when he instituted the protection of foreign 
investments and copyrights to protect original work law, creating a source of revenue that was 
not oil-related (Amuzegar 53-54).  Khatami has also played upon this interest of reducing 
dependence on oil and promoted Persian carpets and pistachios into the market as successful 
alternatives to black gold.  His ultimate fiscal goal during his terms as President was the 
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establishment of rail lines between Central Asia and ports on the Shatt al-Arab in the Persian 
Gulf (Montaigne 27).  However, Iran’s economic growth is inhibited greatly by the United 
State’s blocking of its entry into the World Trade Organization.  Along with the European 
Union’s trade cooperation agreements, Iran could have a renaissance economy, for it is rich in 
natural and human resources (Amuzegar 55).  
Besides the economy, Khatami has become a notable figure for his handling of other 
areas of reform.  Yet, people remain frustrated because Khatami follows Khomeini’s slow pace 
of change that had turned many Iranians against the Islamic Revolution.  Khatami’s election 
came about because of his popular “restrained populist message” of keeping the traditions of 
Islam while testing Western concepts of democracy, marking revolutionary accomplishments in 
emphasizing privacy and “civil rights and freedoms.”  His greatest victory lay in how he was 
able to attract all strata of society, especially the lucrative groups of women, intellectuals, 
businessmen, and most significantly, the Third Force (Montaigne 14). 
However, this is not to say that Khatami has been magically able to liberalize the system 
with grand successes.  Indeed, Khatami’s administration has been plagued with problems, 
ranging from the economy to women.  Critics point out a number of loopholes and injustices, 
such as the disappearances of some intellectuals and the conviction of politicians from Khatami’s 
own reform movement on unsubstantiated charges.  Khatami’s limited power and opposing 
views with the Ayatollah make his reforms difficult to pass, especially in a country where clerics 
run an economy they know little about.  Rural women are sheltered compared to their urban 
counterparts, and literacy is dropping in rural areas as families are attempting to make ends meet.  
Despite Khatami’s economic reforms, the economy has suffered huge blows, including inflation 
of 20% a year and a drop in per capita income (Montaigne 22-23).  High oil prices allowed Iran 
to benefit to a healthy increase in GDP of 6% a year (“Defiant Iran:  The World of the 
Ideologues” 24), yet dropping prices in the market today are wounding the nation reliant upon 
the precious resource for national income.  Other blows include brain drain, the war with Iraq 
during the 1980’s (in addition to the current war in Iraq), U.S. trade sanctions, and a population 
that could double (Montaigne 23). 
As Khatami nears the end of his term, his administration faces challenges that threaten to 
destroy what liberalization Khatami did achieve in his two terms as President.  Opponents in the 
conservative parties are gaining power in unusually high numbers after recent elections, as the 
Council of Guardians disqualified more than 2000 reformist candidates, granting an enormous 
break for right wing politicians.  These newly elected members find Khatami’s views too foreign 
friendly with “conciliatory policies abroad and liberalizing measures at home.”  To counter this, 
the attempt to gain nuclear capabilities has begun in efforts to isolate the country from 
liberalization and western values.  Furthermore, Khatami’s efforts are being torn apart, as 
Parliament revised a “liberalizing development plan” approved by the prior liberal Parliament 
which emphasized foreign involvement in the economy via investments and privatization.  
Slowly, the instruments of the reform party for change-the press and the Parliament-have been 
silenced due to rigged elections designed to benefit the conservatives.  The blooming of debate 
that had occurred before and during the Khatami administration’s earlier years are dying, giving 
way to conservative rhetoric (“Defiant Iran:  The World of the Ideologues” 24). 
Khatami’s revolutionary reform movement is suffering a serious setback and seems 
doomed for an early demise in the social arena as well.  Khatami had pushed for improved 
penitentiary surroundings and preached tolerance of political opinions – two ideas that did not 
take well with the conservatives now in power.  The conservatives favor tightening the social 
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restrictions that annoyed them to no end under Khatami, as the “morality police” are once again 
coming back to life, particularly against women.  Popular perception is also favoring the 
conservatives once more, as Parliament revitalized loss making factories, the launching of 
various infrastructure projects following Khomeini’s popular “Crusade for Construction” 
concept.  Youth are less politically involved as exit polls reported disappointing numbers earlier 
this past election season, and anti-Iranian satellite channels no longer remain popular (“Defiant 
Iran:  The World of the Ideologues” 26). 
What hinders the advent of further advancements in the reform movement is largely the 
United States and its foreign policy stance with Iran.  There remain five obstacles to the 
recommencement of normal international relations with Iran that the United States has repeatedly 
made clear:  official and documented state sponsorship of terrorism around the world and 
specifically against the United States; a quest for weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear 
weapons; opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process and Israel’s right to exist; threats to 
neighbors in the Persian Gulf who are allies with the United States; violation of human rights 
within Iran; and the accusation that Iran protects al-Qaeda operatives within its borders 
(Amuzegar 45).  In addition, already frozen relations plunged deeper into coldness as it was 
unearthed that Karine-A arms shipments from Iran were sent to Palestinian operatives active in 
violence against Israel (Hollis 6).  For its part, Iran has set aside a list of demands that must be 
met for any relation between the United States and Iran.  The original three parts to the demands 
were:  acceptance of the 1979 Revolution and the Ayatollah as Iran’s leader; absolutely no 
interference in the domestic policies of Iran; and “respect and equality” for the regime’s systems 
of operation.  However, as time has passed, Iran has increased its demands of the United States 
to include:  the relieving of U.S. economic sanctions against Iran; the release of frozen Iranian 
assets in the United States; the immediate departure of the United States Navy from the Persian 
Gulf; an end to one-sided, favorable support towards Israel; and finally, a formal apology for 
American “misdeeds” against the country.  Given the countries’ resistance, it seems unlikely one 
will give in to the other’s demands (Amuzegar 46). 
In recent months, various world events have created rifts in Iranian policy, and the reform 
movement may suffer.  Near the end of the Clinton administration, the Iranian government under 
Khatami had begun to forge bonds, inching towards a possible reconciliation between the two 
nations.  However, the advent of the Bush administration put an immediate halt to such plans, 
especially when, in a State of the Union speech, President Bush piled Iran together with Iraq and 
North Korea as the “Axis of Evil.”  Bush had motivations of pleasing his frightened nation and 
attracting international support for the war on terror, warning Tehran that missteps would lead to 
grave danger.  European allies felt uneasy with such a proposition, and Iran lashed back at the 
United States for what they considered insulting and preposterous indictments.  Both reformers 
and conservatives were joined in anger against the United States at the allegations (Amuzegar 
46).  Recent nuclear capabilities have choked the Iranian reform movement, as Mohammed 
ElBaradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, has announced that Iran has 
committed violations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.  Iran has consistently retracted 
from undertakings to stop making centrifuge components, claiming that the nation is seeking an 
alternative form of energy, although evidence suggests otherwise, giving rise to the concern that 
Iran’s isolationist policy may be leaving its promising reform movement in its infancy (“Defiant 
Iran:  The World of the Ideologues” 24).  Yet another factor that seems to be an obstacle in the 
path towards reform in the international circle is Iran’s strategic position in what many call a 
“dangerous neighborhood.”  Bordering contentious Iraq, holding grudges against Pakistan, 
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unfriendly with Afghanistan, and isolated from most other Middle Eastern nations because of its 
neutrality in Operation Desert Storm, Iran has found itself in the heart of the war on terror and 
noticeably alone.  American sanctions and wariness of both Iran and Iraq allowed Iran’s now 
notorious connections with the European Union’s trade circles.  Understanding their unique role 
as negotiators between both sides, the EU has repeatedly asked the Islamic Republic to accept an 
additional protocol; however, the United States has not taken an active role on this issue, mainly 
because of its focus on Iraq (Hollis 6).  Moreover, Iran’s reform movement has recently been put 
on hold because of the war in Iraq.  Its challenge for survival of the regime lies in the possibility 
that the United States may achieve their goal of a free Iraq.  The results of this situation could 
eventually determine the fate of the Iranian theocracy geographically, Iran could become 
completely surrounded by American allies and forces.  A free Iraq could also hurt Iran through 
the mobilization of the Third Force, whose confidence in regime change could be bolstered.  Iran 
also faces economic hardship once pipelines begin to flow again in war-torn Iraq; combined with 
a decline in oil prices, gasoline in Iraq would be able to overpower Iranian oil.  For a nation that 
relies virtually solely on oil for its survival, the opening of Iraqi oil pipelines may spell disaster 
for the Iranian government (Amuzegar 55-56).  Iran may have connections to Sunni militants and 
Muqtada al-Sadr’s insurgents to help oust American forces.  Combined with these developing 
international events, Iran’s reform movement faces difficult times ahead promoting its liberal 
policies and view that internationalism and cooperation with the West will lead to a safer and 
more prosperous Iran. 
Iran’s modern reform movement faces a daunting task in surviving the obstacles in its 
path, including the reemergence of conservatives in Parliament and the international community.  
Many are pessimistic about the revival of the fervor that had been energized by Khatami.  
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s power and support is increasing, and American action in the region is 
helping neither the peace process nor the reform movement.  However, it is necessary to note 
that Iran’s Third Force remains mobilized and unhappy.  Should the conservative government 
rejuvenated in recent elections fail in any way, the Iranians may drum up support once more for 
the liberal reformists to come to power again-it happened prior to Khatami’s election, and it may 
certainly happen again in Iran’s often unpredictable political climate. 
On May 23rd, 1998, Mohammad Khatami spoke at a rally organized by many of the 
disenfranchised young voices of the Third Force.  Here, he reiterated his goals of a just social 
environment and liberalization.  In the midst of his speech, a group began to call for “Death to 
America!”  Soon afterwards, a deafening roar of “Death to Monopoly!” conquered.  An observer 
writes, “For a moment Khatami stood quietly…Then he uttered a remark that silenced 
everybody.  ‘I prefer,’ said the President of Iran, ‘to talk about life, not death’” (Montaigne 33). 
The flower of hope may yet blossom for Iran. 
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